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Abstract 
Two alternative emergency-vaccination strategies with a marker vaccine that could have been 
applied in the 1997/98 Dutch Classical Swine Fever (CSF) epidemic were evaluated in a modified 
spatial, temporal and stochastic simulation model, InterCSF. In strategy 1, vaccination would only 
be applied to overcome a shortage in destruction capacities. Destruction of all pigs on vaccinated 
farms distinguishes this strategy from strategy 2, which assumes intra-community trade of 
vaccinated pig meat. 
InterCSF simulates the spread of CSF between farms through local spread and 3 contact types. 
Disease spread is affected by control measures implemented through different mechanisms. 
Economic results were generated by a separate model that calculated the direct costs (including the 
vaccination costs) and consequential losses for farmers and related industries subjected to control 
measures. The comparison (using epidemiological and economic results) between the different 
emergency-vaccination strategies with an earlier simulated preventive-slaughter scenario led to 
some general conclusions on the Dutch CSF-epidemic. Both emergency-vaccination strategies were 
hardly more efficient than the non-vaccination scenario. The intra-community trade strategy 
(vaccination strategy 2) was the least costly of all three scenarios. 
Keywords: Classical Swine Fever; Pig-microbiological disease; Simulation model; Disease control; 
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1. Introduction 
Outbreaks of animal disease such as classical swine fever (CSF) may have severe consequences on 
the national economy and ask for adequate and immediate response. Preventive vaccination is 
forbidden in the EU and emergency vaccination is only allowed if all other measures to eradicate 
CSF failed. However, with the imminent introduction of a marker vaccine, offering the possibility 
to serologically distinguish infected from vaccinated pigs, emergency vaccination is discussed again 
as a possible supplementary control measure. 
We improved the simulation model InterCSF, which was developed to simulate the 1997/98 
Dutch CSF epidemic, (Jalvingh et al., 1999) by adding emergency-vaccination as a disease-control 
mechanism. InterCSF specifically was developed to answer "what-if questions (Nielen et al., 
1999). Vaccination costs were incorporated in EpiLoss (Meuwissen et al., 1999) for the present 
study, to be able to calculate the direct costs and consequential losses for farmers and related 
industries subjected to control measures. 
The main goal of this paper was to analyse the epidemiological and economic consequences of 
two possible emergency-vaccination campaigns that could have been used in the Dutch CSF 1997-
98 epidemic. They are compared with an earlier simulated preventive-slaughter strategy (Nielen et 
al. 1999), which we will call (in this paper) the "non-vaccination" (NV) scenario. 
* Corresponding author: Tel: *31-317-484065; Fax: *31-317-482745; 
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2. Material and Methods 
2.1 General outline 
InterCSF is a spatial, temporal and stochastic simulation model (Jalvingh et al., 1999). InterCSF 
simulates disease spread from day to day from infected farms through 3 contact types (animals, 
vehicles, persons) and through local spread up to 1000 m. All Dutch pig farms are known by their 
geographical co-ordinates. The main disease-control mechanisms that influence the disease spread 
in InterCSF are: diagnosis of the infected farms, depopulation of infected farms, movement control 
areas, tracing and preventive slaughter (see Jalvingh et al. (1999) for more details). Emergency 
vaccination was incorporated in the base scenario such that it reflected the start situation of the real 
epidemic as closely as possible (see Mangen et al. (2000) for further details). 
2.2. Vaccination effects 
Vaccination has two effects: reduction in virus spread of an infected farm and protection against 
infection of a susceptible herd. 
For virus reduction on an infected farm, two kinds of infected farms were distinguished. The first 
category consisted of infected farms that were never vaccinated and of farms that were first infected 
and later vaccinated. The second category was farms that were vaccinated and became later 
infected. 
For the first category of infected farms, we assumed no reduction in virus spread. All parameters 
remained as described in Jalvingh et al. (1999). In short, the infectious period started between 5 and 
10 days after infection. The infectivity of the farm remained the same for the total infectious period, 
which ended on the day that the farm was depopulated. The interval between infection and detection 
was modelled with a single probability distribution, based on observations of the real Dutch CSF 
epidemic. The selected interval could be influenced downward by certain events (see Table 1). The 
detection probabilities of non-vaccinated farms were used as a base to estimate the detection 
probabilities for all vaccinated farms (Table 1). Vaccination as such could also influence detection 
because infected farms could be detected earlier due to clinical inspection on the vaccination day. 
The detection probability depended on the time since infection and the source of infection (Table 2). 
For a direct animal contact we defined a higher probability of detection for the first weeks after 
infection than for all other contacts. If an infected farm was not detected during vaccination, we 
assumed that the virus was spread mechanically and massively over the farm during vaccination. 
After the incubation time of 1 week, the large number of sick animals could again lead to a possible 
earlier detection (Tielen; Personal communication). In both cases, we assumed that 2 days after 
suspicion, the diagnosis was established. For all other events, more time consuming tests are 
necessary; so, we defined 7 days after suspicion before diagnosis would be given (de Smit et al, 
1999). 
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Table 1. 
Probability of detection based on a control event (such as traced contacts, surveillance, preventive 
slaughter, end-screening and welfare slaughter) depending on the time since infection and the farm 
specific vaccination status in a movement-restricted zone. 
Time Probability of detection by control event (diagnosis date 7 days after event) 
since Traced Surveillance Preventive End-screening Welfare 
infection contacts' (3 km radius)8 slaughter3 slaughterb 
(days) NV IVd Vf NV IVd VIe NV IVd Vf NV IVd VIe NV IVd VIe 
0-14 
15-28 
29-42 
>42 
c 
0 
1 
1 
1 
.9 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
c 
0 
0 
.25 
1 
.9 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
c 
0 
1 
1 
1 
.9 
1 
1 
1 
0 
.5 
1 
1 
c 
0 
.25 
.5 
1 
.9 
1 
1 
1 
0 
.5 
1 
1 
c 
0 
0 
0 
1 
.9 
1 
1 
1 
0 
.5 
1 
1 
Based mainly on clinical inspection. 
b
 Based mainly on serology. 
CNV: No vaccination; farm already has an (undetected) infection (Jalvingh et al., 1999). 
drV: Vaccination of a farm already infected (but not yet detected). 
e
 VI: Vaccination of a farm which later becomes infected 
Table 2. 
Probability of detection due to vaccination, relative to the time since infection on an (undetected) 
infected farm and depending on the source of infection 
Time between infection 
entrance and 
vaccination 
(days) 
0 - 1 4 
1 5 - 2 8 
2 9 - 4 2 
>42 
Probability of detection related to vaccination (diagnosis 
Vaccination daya 
0.25 
0.9 
0.99 
0.99 
Vaccination dayb 
0.05 
0.5 
0.9 
0.99 
date 2 days later) 
1 week after 
vaccination 
0.9 
0.95 
1 
1 
b 
Farm infected by direct animal contact. 
Farm infected by transport or person contact. 
For vaccinated farms infected after vaccination (the second category), a reduction in virus spread 
was expressed by a reduction factor. This reduction factor depended on the time interval between 
vaccination and infection and was modelled with a probability distribution, based on EU 
experiments (see Appendix in Mangen et al. (2000)). The reduction factor was multiplied by the 
probabilities of transmission for a simulated contact and for local spread. 
For the farms in the second category, we assumed no change in the latent period but the 
infectious period was reduced to at most 1 month. Only small outbreaks typically are expected on 
vaccinated farms. Assuming that vaccinated pigs show no or few clinical signs when infected, 
detection could only be by serological screening (Table 1). 
Susceptible farms also were classified in two categories: non-vaccinated and vaccinated farms. 
We defined a non-vaccinated susceptible farm as one without protection against a possible 
infection, whereas a vaccinated susceptible farm was partly protected. The degree of protection 
depended on the time interval between vaccination and a possible infection and was expressed as a 
protection factor, modelled by a probability distribution (See Appendix in Mangen et al. (2000)). 
Similar to the reduction factor, the protection factor was multiplied by the probabilities of 
transmission for a simulated contact and for local spread. However, if an infectious pig was moved 
to a susceptible vaccinated farm, the protection factor was not considered. We assumed that this 
farm always became infected but could hardly ever become infectious. 
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In the EU field experiments, horizontal transmission was significantly reduced 3 weeks after 
vaccination for both marker vaccines (Anonymous, 1999). In our base emergency-vaccination 
scenarios, we assumed that maximum protection and reduction was reached after 21 days. For 
sensitivity analysis (not shown in this paper), this time interval was reduced by 5 days to 16, as well 
as increased by 5 days to 26 days. In an additional analysis, only 1 week was assumed to be needed 
to build up the maximum protection level (simulating a live-virus vaccine). 
2.3 Simulated emergency vaccination alternatives 
Two emergency vaccination strategies were simulated, the delayed destruction strategy (DD) and 
the Intra-Community trade strategy (ICT). DD assumed no acceptation of vaccinated pig meat as 
fresh meat, the actual EU policy. Destruction of all vaccinated herds distinguished DD mainly from 
ICT, which assumed intra-community trade of vaccinated pig meat. For more details see Mangen et 
al. (2000). 
2.4 Vaccination costs 
To be able to compare the emergency vaccination alternatives with each other, both epidemiological 
and economic parameters were needed. A separate model (EpiLoss) using the output of the 
InterCSF model as input generated economic results. EpiLoss calculated the direct costs related to 
the specific events on pig farms (e.g. depopulation, welfare slaughter...) and the consequential 
economic losses suffered by the farmers and by the related industries, subjected to control 
measures. For details see (Meuwissen et al., 1999). Vaccination related costs were considered as a 
separate cost factor. Preparation costs travel costs and bio-security costs were estimated to be EUR 
272 per farm visit of a vaccination team. The vaccine and the vaccination application costs were 
estimated to be EUR 3.10 per treated pig (EUR 2.27/vaccine and EUR 0.83/application). In the case 
of ICT, vaccination continued on sow farms until the movement restrictions were lifted. Extra costs 
to vaccinate breeding sows and newborn piglets were assumed to be EUR 0.19/farrowing place/day. 
3. Simulation results and discussion 
In earlier simulated non-vaccination strategies, see Nielen et al (1999), starting preventive slaughter 
on the first day of detection was the most effective scenario (Table 3). In the real epidemic 
preventive slaughter started only 2 months later. 
Table 3. 
Key features of the real and the simulated 97/98 Dutch CSF epidemic and of the preventive 
slaughter scenario, now called non-vaccination scenario (for more details see Jalvingh et al. (1999) 
and Nielen et al. (1999)). 
Real epidemic or simulated 
scenario 
Real CSF epidemic 
Simulated CSF epidemic 
Non-vaccination scenario 
(NV) 
# 
Detected 
farms 
429 
374 
70 
Key features (median for simulations) 
# Preventively 
slaughtered 
farms 
1247 
743 
450 
Duration of 
epidemic 
(days) 
>365 
306 
164 
Costs 
*106EUR 
2124 
1137 
590 
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Table 4. 
Comparison of two emergency vaccination strategies for the Dutch 1997-98 CSF epidemic. 
Delayed destruction (DD) Intra-community trade 
(ICT) 
50% 5%-95% 50% 5%-95% 
# Detected farms 
# Preventively slaughtered 
farms 
Duration of epidemic (days) 
# Vaccinated farms 
Direct costs paid for (*10b EUR): 
Stamping out infected herds 
Preventive slaughter 
Welfare slaughter 
Breeding prohibition 
Costs of organisation 
Consequential losses (*106 
EUR) 
Vaccination costs (*106 EUR) 
Total (*106 EUR) 
58 
1177 
108 
1038 
7 
141 
169 
5 
39 
201 
3 
567 
48-92 
1084-1930 
99-177 
958-1602 
5-10 
130-184 
157-250 
4-7 
36-54 
185-276 
3-4 
522-769 
68 
-
258a 
1135 
10 
-
290 
-
44 
138 
5 
484 
57-133 
-
236-322 
1043-1961 
8-15 
-
253-423 
-
39-66 
123-206 
5-8 
429-708 
The epidemic length was 138 days + 120 days extra (post-vaccination zone), see (2) for more details. 
Both emergency vaccination strategies were as effective as NV, but the 95 percentile was less 
severe for DD and ICT (Table 4) than for NV (232 detected farms). DD was more effective than 
ICT or NV, as can be seen by the lower number of detected farms and the shorter duration of the 
epidemic, Tables 3 and 4. In case of ICT, no farm was preventively slaughtered. ICT was less costly 
than DD or NV. In case of DD, the costs for preventive slaughter and the consequential losses for 
farmers and related industries are higher than for ICT. The cost for welfare slaughter in DD is lower 
compared to ICT. In case of DD, all vaccinated farms had to be preventively slaughtered, leading to 
high preventive slaughter costs; but the reduced length of the epidemic and the increased number of 
empty farms were leading to low welfare slaughter costs. In case of ICT, extra costs for preventive 
slaughter were avoided; farms and related industries, subjected to control measures, could partly 
continue with their business, which reduced their consequential losses. 
Assuming no extra costs or losses for the post-vaccination zone could lead to an underestimation of 
the calculated costs for the ICT strategy. Further we used average pig prices of 1997 for welfare 
slaughtering and assumed rational consumer behaviour. All three assumptions may be too 
optimistic and could lead to an under- or overestimation of the calculated costs and losses, 
depending on the market reactions and the consumer behaviour. 
4. Conclusion 
The comparison of different emergency vaccination alternatives may lead to some general 
conclusions on the Dutch 1997/98 CSF-epidemic. First of all vaccination costs are minor compared 
to all other costs and losses that occur during an epidemic. Both emergency vaccination strategies 
were at least as effective as the earlier simulated most effective non-vaccination strategy. 
Emergency vaccination seems to be a safety strategy, having less severe worst replications than 
earlier simulated non-vaccination scenarios. DD was more effective than ICT, but ICT was less 
costly than DD. 
This paper could give us an idea what might have happened, if we would have applied emergency 
vaccination as an additional control measure in the specific 97/98 Dutch CSF epidemic. On the one 
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hand, a highly densely populated pig area. On the other hand, 37 undetected infected farms on the 
day of the first detection. 
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